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Languages	of/for	description	of/for	practice.	
Catherine	Doherty		
School	of	Education,	University	of	Glasgow.		
	
	
Paper	for	BERA	SIG	Event:		‘Hybridising	social	theory	in	educational	research’	
Tuesday	9th	July	2019,	St.	Andrew’s	Building,	University	of	Glasgow.		
	
	
The	field	of	education	thrives	on	a	spurious	distinction	between	theory	and	practice,	but	typically	
pays	little	attention	to	how	‘practice’	might	be	conceptualised.	In	commonsense	terms,	‘practice’	
can	ironically	refer	to	both	repetition	to	perfect	(‘practice	makes	perfect’),	or	to	the	slippage	
between	the	prescribed	and	the	enacted	(‘in	theory	..	but	in	practice	…’).	In	this	presentation	I	
explore	how	different	theories	of	practice	similarly	orient	us	to	different	meanings,	insights	and	lines	
of	enquiry.		To	this	end	I	explore	the	difference	between	Bourdieu’s	(1990)	idea	of	practice	as	
temporal	response	generated	by	the	subconscious	work	of	habitus,	and	de	Certeau’s	(1984)	idea	of	
practice	as	generative,	improvised	and	tactical.	What	might	each	of	these	theories	offer	the	
researcher?	Could	their	combination	offer	a	form	of	hybrid	vigour?		
I	am	also	interested	in	how	we	use	theory	to	re-describe	empirical	observations	or	experiences	in	a	
way	that	allows	us	to	equate	seemingly	disparate	moments	or	phenomena.	This	effort	demands	
attention	to	how	we	move	between	expressions	of	empirical	data	and	expressions	of	theory	in	our	
enquiries.	Bernstein	offers	the	concept	of	‘languages	of	description’	to	distinguish	between	‘the	
descriptions	generated	by	a	model’	and	‘the	potential	enactments	of	the	described’	(Bernstein,	
2000,	p.	131).	A	process	of	translation	allows	the	researcher	to	move	between	these	languages	and	
introduces	a	degree	of	freedom	in	the	‘discursive	gap’	it	creates.	In	this	way,	Bernstein	was	
determined	that	the	craft	of	researchers	allowed	the	empirical	world	to	disrupt	and	muddy	the	
theoretical	project.		
Could	hybrid	theory	play	in	that	discursive	gap?	Could	hybridity	help	us	account	for	what	is	gained	
and	lost	when	one	or	other	theory	is	applied?			How	might	hybrid	theory	orient	us	to	different	
elements	at	the	empirical	surface?		
	
Bernstein,	B.	(2000).	Pedagogy,	symbolic	control	and	identity	(revised	ed.).	Lanham:	Rowman	and	
Littlefield.	
Bourdieu,	P.	(1990).	The	logic	of	practice.	Cambridge:	Polity.		
de	Certeau,	M.	(1984).	The	practice	of	everyday	life.	Los	Angeles:	University	of	California	Press.	
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introduction 
	
The	field	of	education	thrives	on	a	spurious	distinction	between	theory	and	practice,	but	typically	
pays	little	attention	to	how	‘practice’	might	be	conceptualised.		
In	commonsense	terms,	‘practice’	can	ironically	refer	to	both	repetition	to	perfect	something	
(‘practice	makes	perfect’),	or	to	the	slippage	between	the	prescribed	and	the	enacted	(‘in	theory	...	
but	in	practice	…’)	thus	in	opposition	to	the	idea	of	theory.	So	the	championing	of	‘good’	or	‘best’	
practice	becomes	theoretically	interesting.		
Meanwhile,	some	theorists	have	proclaimed	‘the	practice	turn’	in	social	theory,	arguing	that	practice	
should	be	understood	as	the	‘primary	generic	social	thing’	(Schatzki,	2001,	p.	1).	My	reading	of	this	
argument	is	that	we	will	best	understand	the	social	by	attending	to	the	doings	of	humans.	These	
doings	will	be	embodied	as	skills,	mediated	by	artefacts,	and	orchestrated	through	shared	
understandings.	The	social	order	is	thus	created	around	and	through	the	activities	that	bring	people	
together	in	common	or	intersecting	purposes.	The	social	fabric	is	knitted	in	the	nexus	between	
‘arrays	of	activity’	(p.2)	that	deny	both	the	rigid	determinism	of	structuralism,	and	the	plastic	
individualism	of	agency	accounts.		Lynch	et	al.	(2017,	p.	3)	highlight	this	characteristic	tension	
‘between	the	productive	and	reproductive	flows	of	the	social’	and	how	‘the	social	is	constituted	via	
manifestations	that	are	both	singular	in	their	materiality	yet	recognizable	in	a	formal	sense	as	
practices.’	In	other	words,	practice	turn	theorists	argue	that	we	should	pay	attention	to	the	verbs	of	
human	activities,	rather	than	the	nouns	of	structures	and	discourses.		
Under	this	gaze	doing	research	becomes	a	practice	of	interest	as	much	as	teaching	or	schooling.		
In	this	presentation	I	explore	how	different	theories	of	practice	orient	us	to	quite	different	
meanings,	insights	and	lines	of	enquiry.		By	doing	so,	I’m	looking	for	opportunities	for	research	to	
surprise,	to	break	rules,	to	stretch,	trouble	and	mix	models.	I	would	argue	that	such	troubling	is	
important	in	these	days	to	counter	the	growing	appetite	to	measure,	know	and	thus	control	what	
teachers	practise	in	the	search	for	quick	fixes	and	a	misplaced	faith	in	methodological	rigour.			
My	title	plays	with	Moore’s	(1996)		distinction	between	sociology	of	education	and	sociology	for	
education	…	but	I’ll	leave	that	to	your	imagination.		
As	another	introductory	comment,	I’d	like	to	confess	that	I	claim	no	particular	expertise	in	the	
theories	I	discuss	here	…	rather	my	research	wanderings	and	wonderings	have	led	me	to	their	doors	
looking	for	theories	to	fit	my	changing	purposes.	I	do	not	pretend	to	speak	from	an	authoritative	
position	but	rather	I’m	speaking	from	my	own	reading	and	work-in-progress.	For	the	postgraduates	
in	the	audience,	I’d	like	to	stress	that	the	theory	you	use	for	your	phd	may	not	fit	the	next	research	
question	you	work	on.	We	all	need	to	go	off	piste,	take	the	risk	of	working	with	new	ideas	and	
becoming	novices	again.		
I’ll	firstly	look	at	Bourdieu’s	theory	of	practice,	then	I’ll	take	a	look	at	de	Certeau’s	approach	to	
everyday	practice.	Borrowing	Gee’s	good	idea,	I’m	going	to	call	Bourdieu’s	big	P	Practice,	and	de	
certeau’s	little	p	practice.	I’ll	illustrate	how	they	each	help	me	think	about	teachers’	doings	
differently.	Then	I’ll	process	them	through	the	translation	device	of	Bernstein’s	languages	of	
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description	to	see	what	might	count	as	empirical	expressions	of	each	type	of	practice,	and	how	a	
mashup	of	big	P	Practice	and	little	p	practice	might	give	us	some	hybrid	vigour	in	our	enquiries.	
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Practice 1 – Bourdieu’s Big P practice 
	
Bourdieu’s	(1990)	theory	of	practice	highlights	a	temporal	sense	of	the	past	underpinning	the	
subconscious	work	of	habitus	to	act	in	the	present,	and	in	turn	produce	the	future.		
Alongside	his	anthropological	work,	Bourdieu	pursued	a	meta-theoretical	project	of	trying	to	
understand	how	the	social	scientist	draws	a	theoretical	understanding	from	the	social	practices	he	
observed,	such	as	weaving,	marriage,	gift-giving.	He	interrogated	what	it	means	to	build	theoretical	
accounts	of	the	generative	principles	underpinning	a	wide	variety	of	practices,	where	those	that	
practise	the	practice	do	so	unconsciously,	just	doing	‘things	that	one	does	because	they	are	“the	
done	thing”’	(1990,	p.	18).	In	this	case	the	theory	is	understood	to	be	a	very	different	beast	to	the	
practice,	serving	quite	different	purposes	and	audiences.	In	this	way	Bourdieu	juggles	two	‘logics	of	
practice’	–	the	actors’	everyday	frame	for	why	and	how,	and	the	scientific	observer’s	frame	that	
seeks	some	coherence	across	and	between	practices.	In	his	early	book	‘Outline	of	a	theory	of	
practice’	(1977),	he	was	writing	‘as	a	blissful	structuralist’	(1990,	p.	9)	trying	to	satisfy	the	grand	
theory	demands	of	the	contemporary	paradigm	of	structuralism.	In	his	later	book,	‘The	logic	of	
practice’	(1990)	he	is	more	sensitive	to,	and	critical	of,	the	role	of	colonial	mindsets	and	their	
shortcomings	which	made	certain	things	thinkable	or	unthinkable	at	the	time,	thus	becoming	doubly	
reflexive	about	his	practice	of	research.			
In	Bourdieu’s	theory	of	practice,	the	concept	of	habitus	is	central.	Habitus	refers	to	the	deep-seated,	
embodied	and	durable	dispositions,	instilled	and	naturalised	through	primary	and	secondary	
socialization.	One’s	habitus	leverages	any	available	cultural	capitals	to	inform	and	generate	one’s	
practice	within	a	certain	field	of	activity	within	its	network	of	relations	and	the	rules	of	the	field’s	
‘game’.	In	Distinction	(Bourdieu,	1984,	p.	101),		this	is	expressed	as	a	formula	in	the	effort	to	distil	
the	theorised	principle.	Rowlands	and	Gale	(2017,	p.	93)	helpfully	gloss	this:	‘practice	as	the	
outcome	of	internalised	knowledge	that	is	borne	from	history	but	which	manifests	as	an	agent’s	
skills,	proficiencies	and	competencies,	enabling	them	to	understand	what	is	transpiring	and	what	
might	transpire	so	as	to	achieve	a	particular	goal	or	purpose.’		So	it	is	the	habitus	accreted	across	
one’s	history	that	predisposes	one	to	particular	practices.	In	later	work	Bourdieu	rewords	it:		
	
The	theory	of	practice	as	practice	insists	…	that	the	principle	of	this	construction	is	the	
system	of	structured,	structuring	dispositions,	the	habitus,	which	is	constituted	in	practice	
and	is	always	oriented	towards	practical	functions.	(1990,	p.	52)	
 
If	we	were	to	think	about	teachers’	practice,	this	attention	to	the	history	of	the	present	resonates	
with	the	well	documented	tendency	to	teach	how	one	was	taught.	In	other	words,	our	sense	of	what	
teaching	is	and	how	it	should	be	done	was	laid	down	during	our	years	of	‘apprenticeship	of	
observation’	as	school	students	(Lortie,	1975).	Habitus	became	Bourdieu’s	ordering	principle,	
‘capable	of	orienting	practices	in	a	way	that	is	at	once	unconscious	and	systematic’	(1990,	p.	10).	As	
the	generative	principle	of	social	action	it	explained	everything.	It	is	a	form	of	knowing	that	is	
embodied,	rather	than	conscious:	‘The	habitus	-	embodied	history,	internalized	as	a	second	nature	
and	so	forgotten	as	history	-	is	the	active	presence	of	the	whole	past	of	which	it	is	the	product’	
(1990,	p.	56).	As	a	critical	realist,	I	uwould	map	habitus	to	the	level	of	the	real,	as	immanent	
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potentials	that	generate	forces	that	are	ultimately	expressed,	or	emerge,	at	the	level	of	the	
empirical.		Given	this	principle,	practice	becomes	relatively	predictable	and	coherent	with	one’s	
other	actions	and	dispositions:		
	
In	short,	being	the	product	of	a	particular	class	of	objective	regularities,	the	habitus	tends	to	
generate	all	the	‘reasonable’,	‘common-sense’,	behaviours	…	which	are	possible	with	the	
limits	of	these	regularities,	and	which	are	likely	to	be	positively	sanctioned	because	they	are	
objectively	adjusted	to	the	logic	characteristic	of	a	particular	field,	whose	objective	future	
they	anticipate’	(1990,	pp.	55-56).		
	
in	the	same	way	Gee	helpfully	talked	about	‘big’	and	‘little’	d	discourse,	I’ll	term	Bourdieu’s	a	theory	
of	‘big	P’	Practice.	
	
Big	P	practice	would	thus	account	for	the	routines	and	rhythms	of	the	school	day,	the	expected,	
unremarkable	and	taken-for-granted	doings	of	teachers	and	students	alike.	This	is	the	accrued	
muscle	memory	of	practice	in	terms	of	practice-makes-perfect.	This	is	what	and	we	recognise	
teaching	and	schooling	when	we	visit	schools	in	different	settings	with	different	people.	Big	P	
practices	of	western	schooling	have	been	rolled	out	across	the	globe	with	colonisation.	Baker	(2014)	
would	argue	that	these	practices	increasingly	define	and	mediate	post-industrial	society.			
	
In	my	own	research	(Doherty,	2015b,	2015c;	Doherty,	Berwick,	&	McGregor,	2018),	I	have	conducted	
classroom	ethnographies,	looking	for	repetitions	or	Big	P	practices	that	typified	extended	schooling	
for	a	particular	type	of	student,	showing	the	consistent	patterning	of	behavioural	incidents	and	their	
correction	across	five	different	settings.		
	
Bourdieu’s	theory	has	been	revised	and	elaborated	over	time,	to	allow	more	wiggle	room,	more	
conscious	strategy	in	response	to	new	or	dissonant	conditions,	less	determinism,	and	some	
adaptability	into	his	conceptualisation	of	habitus.	Nevertheless,	critics	such	as	Margaret	Archer	
(2007)	accuse	Bourdieu	of	over-stretching	the	concept	in	an	attempt	to	keep	it	relevant	despite	
rapid	social	change	that	robs	habitus	and	thus	practice	of	a	stable	history.	As	a	deep	generative	
force,	habitus	also	becomes	a	difficult	concept	to	grasp	empirically	–	a	problem	I	will	turn	to	later.		
		
Practice 2 – de Certeau’s little p practice 
	
For	the	second	theory	of	practice,	I	turn	to	de	Certeau’s	book,	‘The	practice	of	everyday	life’	(de	
Certeau,	1984)	in	which	he	offers	‘a	science	of	singularity’	(p.	ix)	that	attends	not	to	the	predictable,	
repetitive	or	habitual,	but	rather	to	the	invention,	improvisations	and	creative	ruses	that	bubble	up	
around	these.	I’ll	call	these	little	p	practices.	His	argument	purposefully	responds	to	treatments	of	
social	action	in	which	users	are	‘commonly	assumed	to	be	passive	and	guided	by	established	rules’.	
Rather,	for	de	Certeau,	everyday	practices,	‘ways	of	operating’	(p.	xi)		or	doings	by	people	assumed	
to	be	subject	to	rules	and	imposed	constraint,	offer	a	space	for	invention,	improvisation	and	‘making	
do’	in	unpredictable	ways:	
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The	presence	and	circulation	of	a	representation	(taught	by	preachers,	educators,	and	
popularizers	as	the	key	to	socioeconomic	advancement)	tells	us	nothing	about	what	it	is	for	
its	users.	We	must	first	analyse	its	manipulation	by	users	who	are	not	its	makers’	(p.	xiii)	
de	Certeau’s	(1984)	idea	of	practice	as	generative,	improvised	and	tactical	makes	us	ask	what	the	
actors	in	the	moment	‘make’	of	the	arrangements	and	affordances	of	any	context.	In	this	way,	de	
Certeau	orients	to	exactly	that	which	is	extraneous	and	erased	in	Bourdieu’s	theory	of	practice.	He	
uses	the	example	of	a	speech	act	to	privilege	what	is	termed	parole	as	opposed	to	langue	-		
It	establishes	a	present	relative	to	a	time	and	place;	and	it	posits	a	contract	with	the	other	
(the	interlocutor)	in	a	network	of	places	and	relations.	…	users	make	innumerable	and	
infinitesimal	transformations	of	and	within	the	dominant	cultural	economy	in	order	to	adapt	
it	to	their	own	interests	and	their	own	rules.			
In	this	way,	the	researcher	is	called	to	pay	attention	to	what	makes	the	moment	untypical,	‘the	
clandestine	forms	taken	by	the	dispersed,	tactical,	and	makeshift	creativity	of	groups	or	individuals’	
(p.	xiv).		
De	Certeau	does	not	deny	the	presence	of	rules	and	constraints	on	practice	i.e.	the	weight	of	Big	P	
practice,	but	he	argues	this	is	not	the	whole	story	–	there	are	‘ways	of	using	the	constraining	order	…	
a	degree	of	plurality	and	creativity	..	.an	art	of	being	in	between	(which)	draws	unexpected	results’	
(p.	30).	
In	my	same	research	project	(Doherty,	2019),	I	found	this	theory	really	helpful	to	highlight	how	
teachers	knowingly	broke	rules	themselves	(Doherty,	2015a),	and	to	understand	differences	
between	teachers’	little	p	practices	amid	their	common	larger	Big	P	practice.			
So	the	two	theories	combined	allow	me	to	have	my	cake	and	eat	it	too.	I	can	zoom	out	to	see	both	
the	historical	continuities	of	the	social	institution	and	then	zoom	in	to	momentary	particularities	and	
improvisational	ruses.	Small	p	practice	by	definition	is	ephemeral	–	it	crops	up	opportunistically,	
then	evaporates:	‘characterized	by	its	ruses,	its	fragmentation	(the	result	of	the	circumstances),	its	
poaching,	its	clandestine	nature,	its	tireless	but	quiet	activity,	in	short	by	its	quasi-invisibility’	(p.	31).	
This	makes	little	p	practice	elusive	for	the	empirical	researcher	who	has	to	keep	one	eye	open	to	
such	protean	possibilities.		
So	Bourdieu’s	big	P	practice	asks	the	researcher	to	understand	an	invisible,	subconscious	habitus,	
and	de	Certeau’s	little	p	practice	asks	the	researcher	to	be	alert	to	momentary	flashes.	They	each	
highlight	what	the	other	puts	aside,	suggesting	that	together	they	achieve	a	better	understanding	of	
the	social	and	how	it	unfolds.	In	this	way,	hybrid	theory	offers	the	janus-faced	possibility	of	facing	
both	ways	–	to	the	general	and	the	particular	–	the	ethnography	and	the	case	study.			
In	my	last	section	I	want	to	consider	how	such	theoretical	opposites	might	be	put	to	work	to	in	
empirical	studies.	This	effort	demands	attention	to	how	we	move	between	expressions	of	empirical	
data	and	expressions	of	theory	in	our	enquiries.	
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Languages of/for description 
	
Bernstein	offers	the	concept	of	‘languages	of	description’	which	act	as	‘a	translation	device	whereby	
one	language	is	transformed	into	another’.	Those	of	you	with	a	social	science	background	might	
recognise	this	as	an	elaboration	of	the	process	of	‘operationalisation’.	The	translation	answers	the	
question,	‘how	do	I	recognise	my	theoretical	concepts	in	my	empirical	data?’.		
Bernstein	(2000)	makes	the	distinctions	between	an	Internal	and	an	external	language	of	
description.		
The	internal	language	of	description	(L1)	refers	to	the	conceptual	language,	which	speaks	of/for	
itself.	So	for	example,	for	Marx,	social	class	is	first	and	foremost	one’s	relation	to	the	means	of	
production.	
The	External	language	(L2)	of	description	allows	the	conceptual	language	to	describes	something	
else,	so	it	articulates	the	relationship	between	the	concept	and	‘what	counts	as	a	realisation’	such	
that	the	‘principles	of	description	construct	what	is	to	count	as	empirical	relations	and	translate	
those	relations	into	conceptual	relations’	(p.	133).	
So	the	concept	of	social	class	could	be	re-described	as	occupational	status	across	layers	demarcated	
by	income,	education,	autonomy	and/or	capacity	to	draw	profit.		In	this	way,	the	L2	acts	as	a	reading	
device	for	looking	at	the	empirical	world	through	a	theoretical	lens.	Explicit	consideration	of	what	
counts	as	the	empirical	expression	of	a	concept	allows	analysis	to	proceed	with	unambiguous	
reading	rules	of	what	is	to	count	as	a	relevant	empirical	relation.	In	this	way,	Bernstein	distinguishes	
between	‘the	descriptions	generated	by	a	model’	and	‘the	potential	enactments	of	the	described’	
(Bernstein,	2000,	p.	131).	In	a	perfect	world,	such	work	of	translation	should	inform	the	research	
design	not	just	the	analysis,	so	pertinent	data	is	thoughtfully	generated.	Of	course,	that’s	not	always	
the	case	and	it	is	often	data	that	doesn’t	fit	one’s	model	that	sends	one	looking	for	more	or	different	
theory.		
The	process	of	translation	allows	the	researcher	to	move	between	these	languages	and	introduces	a	
degree	of	freedom	in	the	‘discursive	gap’	it	creates,	that	is,	some	degree	of	freedom	in	the	fit	
between	the	two	languages	of	description.	In	this	way,	Bernstein	was	determined	that	the	craft	of	
researchers	allowed	the	empirical	world	to	disrupt	and	muddy	the	theoretical	project:		
I	believe	we	must	struggle	to	keep	L2	as	free	as	possible.	This	struggle	is	for	pragmatic	and	
ethical	 reasons.	 It	 is	 pragmatic,	 because	 unless	 there	 is	 some	 freedom,	 description	 1	 (the	
internal)	will	never	change.	It	is	ethical,	for	without	some	freedom	the	researched	can	never	
re-describe	the	descriptions	made	of	them.	(Bernstein,	2000,	p.135)	
I	think	we	all	recognise	the	temptation	to	highlight	only	the	data	which	fits	the	theoretical	model	
that	informs	our	studies.	This	is	where	hybrid	theory	might	create	more	value,	depth	and	candour	in	
research.	Servicing	and	privileging	one	theoretical	model	allows	that	which	doesn’t	fit	the	model	fall	
off	the	table.	Hybrid	theory	might	be	able	to	balance	one	L2	with	another,	so	data	which	doesn’t	
serve	the	first	can	be	dignified	and	interrogated	in	the	second.			
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To	turn	to	the	two	theories	of	practice,	the	concept	of	habitus	has	attracted	discussion	about	the	
difficulty	if	not	impossibility	of	recognising	subconscious	dispositions	empirically:	‘putting	Bourdieu’s	
theoretical	concepts	to	work	as	part	of	methodological	decisions	and	development	of	data	collection	
instruments	is	still	regarded	by	many	–	especially	those	new	to	research	–	as	a	‘black-box’	of	social	
inquiry’	(Costa,	Burke,	&	Murphy,	2019,	p.	20).	In	the	everyday	operation	of	habitus	in	familiar	fields,	
the	model	of	the	subconscious	‘fish	in	water’	makes	this	outcome	difficult	to	unambiguously	
evidence.	Rather,	the	outcomes	and	working	of	habitus	are	easier	to	identify	when	it	is	at	odds	with	
the	field	producing	the	emotions	and	discomfort	of	the	‘fish	out	of	water’.		Similarly,	the	acquisition	
of	a	professional	habitus	(learning	one’s	trade,	internalizing	external	instruction)	might	offer	more	
empirical	traces	as	pedagogic	work	turns	conscious	learning	into	naturalized	practice	(Rowlands	&	
Gale,	2017).	In	the	case	of	teachers,	this	might	be	possible	through	tracking	neophytes	as	they	
acquire	experience	and	learning	sediments	into	new	habits	and	dispositions.		
	
De	Certeau’s	conceptualisation	of	practice	offers	more	empirical	access,	perhaps,	suggesting	a	
external	language	of	description	that	can	identify	moments	when	actors,	teachers	in	this	case,	
depart	from	the	usual	script,	and	knowlingly	undermine,	sidestep	or	disrupt	routines	or	rules.	The	
trick	is	that	the	research	would	have	to	be	able	to	recognise	the	routine,	to	be	able	to	recognise	its	
disruption.	In	this	way,	I	have	used	classroom	ethnography	to	warrant	extended	time	in	classrooms,	
but	kept	an	eye	for	disruptive	moments	...	in	other	words,	I	tend	to	use	a	hybrid	design,	so	I’m	open	
to	being	surprised	by	the	data.		
	
Bernstein	was	critical	of	methodological	purism	and	its	quick	fixes.	Rather	he	argued	research	should	
‘alert	us	to	new	possibilities,	new	assemblies,	new	ways	of	seeing	relationships’	(2000,	p.	133)	in	the	
discursive	gap	between	languages	of	description.	Hybridity	helps	us	capture	what	is	gained,	and	
recapture	what	is	lost	when	one	or	other	theory	is	applied.	Each	explores	beyond	the	limits	of	the	
other.	In	this	way,	hybridity	could	help	ferment	‘a	culture	which	encourages	either	theoretical	
innovation	or	methodological	disturbances’	(Bernstein,	2000,	p.	132)			
	
Conclusion 
	
So	to	recap,	I	have	highlighted	the	ubiquitous	binary	between	theory	and	practice	in	education	
scholarship,	and	the	field’s	insufficient	thinking	about	how	practice	might	be	conceptualised.	I	
situated	my	wondering	in	the	growing	interest	in	practice	as	the	site	of	the	social.	I	looked	at	two	
quite	different	treatments	of	practice	–	Bourdieu’s	theory	of	practice	that	pivots	on	the	generative	
principle	of	habitus,	and	de	Certeau’s	theory	of	everyday	practice	which	orients	to	the	minutiae	of	
ways	of	operating	in	and	around	rules	and	routines.	Both	offer	interesting	and	complementary	lines	
of	enquiry	when	we	think	of	teachers	and	their	practice.	While	this	makes	an	argument	for	hybrid	
theory,	I	also	briefly	argued	for	hybrid	methodologies	that	can	flirt	with	more	than	one	theoretical	
framing.	I	like	the	idea	of	hybrid	theory	for	its	refusal	of	neatness	and	its	fertile	contradictions.	I	
think	that	hybridity	is	going	to	be	more		productive	when	it	comes	to	understanding	complex	social	
settings	and	practices	such	as	education	with	its	multiple	parties	and	politics.		
I	also	think	that	hybridity	is	also	a	useful	check	to	avoid	committing	grand	theory:		
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• To	at	least	some	of	those	who	claim	to	understand	it,	and	who	like	it,	it	is	one	of	the	greatest	
advances	in	the	entire	history	of	social	science;		
• To	many	of	those	who	claim	to	understand	it,	but	who	do	not	like	it,	it	is	a	clumsy	piece	of	
irrelevant	ponderosity.	(These	are	rare,	if	only	because	dislike	and	impatience	prevent	many	
from	trying	to	puzzle	it	out.)	
• To	those	who	do	not	claim	to	understand	it,	but	who	like	it	very	much	–	and	there	are	many	
of	these	–	it	is	a	wondrous	maze,	fascinating	precisely	because	of	its	often	splendid	lack	of	
intelligibility.		
• Those	who	do	not	claim	to	understand	it	and	who	do	not	like	it	–	if	they	retain	the	courage	
of	their	convictions	–	will	feel	that	indeed	the	emperor	has	no	clothes.	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (C.	Wright	Mills,	1959/2000,	p.	26	
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